The Ultimate Principle

Let's start our discussion with a conclusive statement

The Quran has its own cosmology.

This is both a statement and a disclaimer. On its basis, we're to forget, or at least 'rethink' those concepts espoused by modern science.

If you accept modern cosmological concepts, as many of us implicitly do, then you're understanding of the Quran is, and will be, tainted with those concepts. In other words you'll treat it as an accessory to modern science, as something to be shaped and reinterpreted to fit those preconceived, universally accepted--but scarcely understood--'scientific' conceptions, so much so that, Quranic passages containing ideas that seem to contradict 'science', are systematically 'beaten into shape', and refigured, to fit the ruling narrative. One such idea, among numerous others, is the 'earth' & ‘Heavens’ (asamawat & Ard), taken in conjunction.

It's worth mentioning, first, that what we call science, is simply the program of description. We want to 'explain phenomena' in the most accurate way that we know. Our resort, in such situations, are 'systems of description', 'alphabets' of sorts. We instinctively draw from a preexisting pool of vocabularies and formulae, from certain 'lexica' in order to telegraph an experience. Here, language is our medium before we get to those complex systems which language 'mediates'. Thus we find even in 'systems' which appear to have nothing to do with language, specifically those 'visual' ones, like geometry, 'linguistic' parallels, 'prepositions' for example, serve as spatial coordinates, and, more than that, 'temporal' coordinates. You'll also find, if you look close enough, that the laws of mathematics are unintelligible without grammar (or, are grammatical), hence why, to establish a comprehensive outline of the principles of mathematics, Bertrand Russell makes a necessary detour to grammar (Chapter 4 and 5 of his magnum opus 'The Principles Of Mathematics').

This is done because, it's realized at some point that mathematical operations constitute merely the instrumental part of experience; the 'intentional' part; the part that involves 'volition' or, in Aristotelian terms 'techne'. This is the domain in which the analysis takes place. philosophical mathematicians (or mathamatical philosophers) of the likes of Liebniz, Husserl and others, have long ago discerned the aporia that spawns from a worldview that exclusively accounts for the 'intentional' or 'instrumental' part, and disregards that other part that's more fundamental (a part which being more important, we have inversely less control over); involving how phenomena 'disclose' themselves to us and which had been the chief occupation of logicians and theorists of knowledge (Hegel, Fichte, Kant, Locke etc..).

And thus a branch of 'philosophy' arose called phenomenology whose chief task is to study that shadowy aspect of experience that's fundamental to everything else. This isn't a historical exegesis, we only want to point out that 'science', the legacy of Descartes and Galileo, has a blind spot which, having failed to fully make sense of, chose to completely ignore, hence the clearly pronounced divide between philosophy and science, a divide so sharp that 'scientists', particularly cosmologists of the likes of Hawking and others don't even consider the speculative aspects of what they, rather pontifically, call 'science' to be in any way 'philosophical', needless to say that this is because 'philosophy' involves considerations of an ontological nature, and, what i suppose they 'fear', implications which may force them to reconsider ideas to which they seem to have laid permanent claim.

Now, that other world, that's less pronounced, that's mysterious, and mysteriously difficult to understand, is what the physicist is busy with, however, the difference between phenomenology, Husserl, Hiadaggar, Fichte (i put Leibniz in this group), and someone like Maxwell, Newton, Einstein, Planck etc.., is that the latter group, reliable and monumental as their achievements are, don't account for the subjective nature of their constructions, in other words, they don't see what from the perspective of the first group is the 'descriptive' nature of their systems, as constructs rooted in the subject, or, the inherent subjectivity of all science. Much of scientific and philosophical history is a grapple over 'which approach' is valid. And only a handful of scholars, particularly historians of ideas (the so called Neo-Kantians, Lovejoy and Gadamar among others) have glimpsed the beneficent side of this contention; that both worldviews are equally valid, though one may at any point in history take 'lead'.

Two Scientific Temperaments

The fact of the matter is, both approaches are aporetic in their own way, neither, taken on its own is absolutely valid, not at least without the other. Cassirer notes this in his 1943 paper Newton & Leibniz

"For Newton space and time were not only real things, but the very framework of reality. They belong not merely to the material world; they are absolute attributes of God. All this is asserted by Leibniz to be radically wrong. Time and space are not separate existences; they possess no substantial reality of their own. They are "forms" or "orders", not things; they are not absolute, but merely relative"

“For Newton it is clear that space and time, as absolute entities, are beyond the reach of immediate sense experience. For Leibniz, on the other hand, they are pure intellectual forms which involve a constructive power of the human mind”

By 'aporia' is meant, as defined etymologically, "professed doubt as to where to begin,". This however is not the problem of the logician or the scientist, but rather, the philosopher of science or the historian of logic; for the former (the scientist or logician) no such 'aporia' arises. He's not 'occluded' by the above question 'which is valid', rather, the question does not, and, by necessity, cannot, occur to him. He, as the modern idiom goes, 'hits the ground running' as a representative of either worldview. The 'beneficent' part is seen, in the Newton's case of ascribing 'absolute', independent existence to space and time, in what said profession, as regards whatever is meant by absolute, allows him to do as an analyst.

As an analyst, such concepts, especially those pertaining to his immediate object of study, subsist as hypotheses, or, as Kant would say 'regulative ideas', supplying or providing certain conditions (the right conditions) which are conducive to analysis, or, to be more exact, the analytical 'temperament' of the analyst. The question really, is not which worldview is valid, and which is false, but what 'attitude' arises from which 'worldview'?, and, reciprocally, what worldview arises from which attitude. Here we've transcended the dogma, as had others like Jung (who broadly discusses this in his ‘psychological types’), William James and others.

A worldview such as Newton’s there, as opposed to that of Leibniz's, involves more than 'analysis'; the admission of the superlative 'absolute' such as would enable Newton to establish the laws of mechanics, necessitates an element of 'comportment', in a sense, he doesn't question the relativity of the laws as Leibniz would, because, in a certain sense, he's already subject to them, and their 'validity', if not absolute, could not serve as regulative ideas. In being 'subject' to them, or, let's say, his 'adherence' to those, as Leibniz's would interpret them, 'ideal constructs', allowed him to treat their implications, motion, inertia etc.. in a way which Leibniz's more ‘grammatic’ or ‘logical’ temperament scarcely permits him. For what are the linguistic or 'metaphorical' connotations of the term 'absolute' if not something approximating 'law', or 'foundation', or what from the perspective of the analyst, 'reality', which is what the notion of law, readily manifests itself as. It's not to be doubted that such a worldview gives its subscriber an advantage over, let's say, its detractors. But having said that, what particular advantage does Liebniz's affords him which Newton's don't??

The answer to this is detailed in the transition which 'science' underwent from the Newtonian mechanics to Einsteinian relativity, which I say is a case of enantiodromia (a Jungian concept), The phase during which Newtonian physics presided over what its zestful adherents at the time perceived as a general stagnation in the field of science, in our interpretation, fulfilled a condition of which Leibniz's worldview at the time was incapable (partly, i suppose due to amorphous state of Liebniz's writings as opposed to Newton's, and, the latter's academic office). Science prior to Newton, some would say, was in a state of disarray. If this statement holds, a question I leave to historians of science, then the service which Newtonian physics had rendered was that of unifying science in confronting one and only one set of problems. In a sense, being unified, even in error, is much better than any alternative, more so for the concerted manner in which any solution to the problem will entail.

Leibniz's system, many have said, was ahead of its time. We first had to have established the ground, or, as it were, the 'principles of science' in a way which Galileo and Descartes could not, a way which the new-found impetus lent by the discovery of calculus had made possible. Thus all scientific and philosophical concerns were redirected towards space and time.

The Leibnizean worldview had to have resigned itself to a mere critique of another system--where its strength lies--rather than 'lead the way' which is to be the chief role of the Newtonian system, and in this dynamic relation, each gains a valid position. Liebniz's could not lead, for a critique of the concepts of space, such as found in his third paper to Samual Clarke, is meaningful only as a critique, that is, adopting a Leibnizian approach to space and time, assumes that one has assimilated them, and assimilated them in a specifically Newtonian way, in order to point out their shortcomings and contradicts; another analytical temperament within the temperament. Thus, by critiquing Newton, Leibniz only exacerbated what from his perspective is a problem, and in formulating said critique in the form of a new, alternative system, Einstein gave Newton's system a more precise definition.

"The boldness and the high philosophical significance of Einstein's doctrine consists" we read, e.g., in the work of Laue, "in that it clears away the traditional prejudice of one time valid for all systems"

Substance and Function, and Einstein's Theory Of Relativity p414

Leibniz's concepts of space and time are meaningful only as a critical exposition of space and time as conceived in the system of Newton. For example, the validity of Space & Time are assumed in the monadology, not outlined. Or you can say, the monadology is a treatment--an advanced treatment--of some properties of space & time, not a general outline of them. For things like 'substance', 'compound', 'simple' and things, must be cases of something, musn't they?, by which I mean some general, all encompassing principle.

As cassirer put it

"As we see, it is the unity of the abstract and the concrete, of the ideal and the empirical in which the demands of the physicist and the philosopher agree; but while the one goes from experience to the idea, the other goes from the idea to experience" p419

...And going from experience to idea is exactly what Leibniz does. In a sense, going from idea to experience has a certain 'finality' to it, for it's the general trajectory which all phenomena whatsoever take, the product which a 3D printing machine constructs, is posterior to the design--i.e its abstract form, not prior. Even the troubadour poet who composes his poetry spontaneously or 'on the spot' follows this trajectory, insofar as the final product has a certain distinct 'form' and structure to it.

To return to the question as to what what particular advantage does Liebniz's temperament affords him which Newton's don't. The answer is found in the above quote, in that it clears away the traditional prejudice of one time valid for all systems" which is to say that the worldview espoused by the 'Leibnizean-minded' thinker finds its chief advantage in its systematicity; The former 'dogmatism', or, in the author's term 'prejudice', is here diversified (or, exacerbated--a dysphemism), but in such a way that the crux that lies at the center of the problem is kept in tact. Thus the Newtonian-Leibnizian dialectic pans out two hundred years later with the advent of Einsteinian physics where we see something like a Newtonian Monodology.

Newton and Leibniz, the battle is fought between two thinkers of

equal intellectual stature, then the struggle does not end in the

defeat or victory of one party; it leads rather to a new synthesis

of scientific and philosophic thought

Ground & Process

The system of the Quran (and, to add, it takes some thinking to actually glimpse its systematic nature), establishes those fundamental concepts early on, in fact, no single Quranic proposition has any meaning outside said 'systematicity'. What's meant by 'system' is something much more complex than might seem 'obvious' to the reader; but for this, we first require the aid of a popular definition as a launch point.

This is adequate, in many ways, but certainly not to the physicist, for physics itself studies 'system' (i use system in the superlative sense); the quintessential system; the system from which all systems are derived. This is none other than what's known as Space-Time. Having established the concepts of space and time individually, through Newton, the course of science was set, and what the Einstenian phase represents is the 'deepening' of this relation; of unearthing, so to speak, the dark complexities which Newton's 'Principia' could not possibly enumerate.

The caveat which we hereby add to the term 'system' is that, more than the notion of 'interconnectivity' or 'link' between things is to be admitted. Said 'understanding' (systematicity) must somehow be 'envisaged' as a ‘whole-in-motion', this points to Newton. In other words, given a concept 'Color'; those relations which fall under it, the specific colors and shades, and further into the invisible minutiae of 'light' phenomena which subsist within and from which arise specific colors and gradations thereof; we don't discard the concept 'color' as we descend into these details, but rather, 'color' parenthesizes the whole analysis. Color here serves that same function ascribed to the concepts of 'space-time'. But it doesn't stop at this analogy, as this involves a bit of Cantorian infinity, where, as we can see, a concept has this peculiar ability to be 'recapitulated' in 'lower concepts', e.g 'Color' is the class under which falls 'Red', but 'Red' is also the class under which falls 'Crimson' or any other shade of Red.

Here, with color, or Red, we can say that the system is in 'motion' with respect to its constituents, and, in a sense, absolute in relation to them since their 'absolute-ness' directly accrues from its inclusive 'status' relative to them, but this 'absolute' charactar, is contradictorily nullified once a more general concept, more general than 'color', but which includes it, is admitted to the equation. The superiority of Einsteinian relativity over Newtonian mechanics may be said to consist in accentuating this 'recursive' element, or perhaps, of drawing out its implications.

The sort of 'System' which the Quran espouses is something of this sort. The concepts of Heavens' and Earth, are here the analogue of 'Space-Time'. This may cause some to hold us accountable for the same deed from which we've originally sought to absolve the Quran (concordism). But something is involved here that's worth placing a caveat.

Note, firstly, the frequency with which the two concepts occur together; frequency which, in turn, makes the relation one of 'collocation'. More than a property of language, the collocation here reflects a relation of a metaphysical nature.

Their collocation is rather telling, more than that, the fact that in this collocation, the Heavens are mentioned as, what some would say, a plural form. But an objection is made here. Firstly, plurality, as far as the Quran goes, is deceivingly complex (but simple on explanation) if approached from the standpoint of indo-european laws of grammar; the plural is synonymous with 'current', in that, 'present' or 'currant' processes, or 'active'---'active' in distinction from 'activity' as a 'universal' case of 'anywhen'. The concept varies from the instance in which the concept occurs. Thus the notion of 'color' exists (anywhen), but is not 'current' unless momentarily used, e.g when you see ‘a color’. It's in this distinct sense that plurality occurs in the Quran---as 'currency' or 'momentousness'

What we understand by this is that the collocation 'Heavens & Earth' in which Heavens is 'active’ or ‘momentous’, is that, in such a relation, Heavens has an 'immediate' bearing, whereas earth reclines into an ‘anywhen’ (concept), this is the case in any relation in which the two are implicated.

Why is that?

This is because, as noted in a previous essay, Earth is a mere 'ground' or 'basis', it's not, in other words, 'current' in the previous sense, but something 'given', the 'current' on the other hand is always the process of which Earth is 'given-to'. Think about it this way, we first have a concept, but we represent the concept by actually talking about it. this figures for everything else. Any activity whatsoever is based on something, this something of which the activity is an agent always has this 'sense' of being 'prior to' or 'before', and the activity, on the other hand, of 'belonging to' or 'representing’. In grammar, we use the prepositional case 'of' to indicate this relation.

The Quranic use of Heavens & Earth in such a case, and in any case, is not just an example of this principle of 'Ground and process', but is the principle itself. Thus in the Quran the term 'universe' does not exist. It's not said that God created the 'world' or 'universe', rather, that God created the 'Heavens and Earth', thereby posting something more fundamental than what's implied or suggested in a proposition like 'universe' or 'world'.

For the world or Universe posits nothing save a vague sense of 'all there is', or, 'all that which exists'. But, this confers 'reality' to 'something', as in, the world, in some sense is a concrete 'something', whereas the conjunction 'heavens and earth', describes the principle of 'becoming' which any concrete thing may be represented by, and by extension, one single process inclusive of all other processes, whether already in existence, or emerging.

Thus the 'Heavens' occurs in 'plural' form so as to emphasize its 'currency' in this dynamic as opposed to the earth's 'givenness', whereas positing the earth would point to the basis on which a certain process (heavens) may proceed. Thus we posit the 'ground', or formulate our axiom, then proceed to draw out all those implications which are contained within it.

Thus I posit Red as the color, then I proceed to draw from 'red' anything in which red is involved, or related to, or pertains to etc... Now, in this dynamic, it's not the earth that's current, but the process itself, of 'describing' or 'talking about' Red. Red served its purpose by being the 'topic'.

Take this verse for example, the Earth is being described as a 'carpet' of some sort; saying that it's been 'paved' for you, and as such, it's ready to be used by us. Thus 'earth' here has that sense of 'before', or 'basis'.

If we approach, as the Quran does, the heavens and earth as the 'universe' as a whole as one inclusive, all encompassing 'dynamic entity', then, it logically follows that the Heavens is the 'current', as the universe in this case, would be something 'unfolding' or 'giving way to', Earth in this equation would be that which is being 'unfolded' or as 'being given way to', or the 'world' having already been created, but is slowly being 'materialized', the materialization process in which the universe is perpetually involved is what the Quran means by Heavens, and why it occurs in that pseudo-plural' form.

Heavens, furthermore has another sense in the Quran. it's used to mean 'name' or 'attribute' (Ism), the name of something, is that which it embodies and represents and which it continuously exists as a representation 'of', in other words, its nature is its 'name', rather than a label.

Prophet Yahya's name, is an attribute of his, his 'Conatus' as Spinoza uses the term, which he's to 'represent' throughout his life.